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This article analyses tl.e particular role played by soft law instniments (such as codes of corporate govelrmlice, codes of conduct, model law
and other non-bil.ding instmments) in shalping the legal frail.ewchc applicable to European and American companies. It concludes that soft
law is a very populai. and successful girl iiowadays, fior legitimate reasons, but one that blings about a series of concerns as well. This article
fi]nds that soft law instniments upset the traditional hierarchy of sources of law and the distinctioi. between civil law and colnmon law
countnes. It also observes that soft law col.vei.ges, and, in turn, provokes further convergence of the legal framewoi.k. Finally, it exemplifies

(and chticizes) Instances of transfiormation oi. soft law into hard law, accompanied by a general pllenomenon of hardening of the legal
fromework, iiicluding because instrulnents soinetimes labelled `soft law' are in reality closer ii. efflect to llard law.
I(eywords: soft law, company law, corporate governance codes, codes of conduct, directlves, regulations, recommendations. g[cen papers, comply oT explain, EMCA, MBCA, All
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I.

INTRODUCTION

Pursuant to the subsidiarity principle,I European Union (EU)

as well, .as evidenced by the practice of the European Securities and

Markets Authority (ESMA) or the European Central Bank (ECB),
Soft law of private origin is represented by a variety of codes

institutions have intervened in company law mattel.s mainly by
means of directives. There are also some regulations, as well as a

drawn up by associations and private entities. They can be subdi-

number of recommendations, resolutions, and green papers. EU

vided into two categories: corporate governance codes (Part I) and

Companies are also subject to financial markets law, which has

codes of conduct intended for various professionals (Part 11). After

more frequently taken the form of regulations, rather than

discussing them in turn, including by reference to their US coun-

directives. EU directives require implementing national legisla-

terparts, I identify a number of common trends (Part Ill).

tion while EU regulations do not and produce direct effects in
the EU Member States. Soft law neither requires implementation

2.

nor produces (direct) effects, whether it is of public or private

There is (at least) one corporate governance code in each EU

Origin.

Member State.2 These codes typically target public companies,

Soft law of public origin emanates from EU and national insti-

CORPORATE GOVERNANCE CODES

although some specifically target private (unlisted) companies (e.g.,

tutions and authorities. EU institutions used soft law mainly in the

the ecoDa3 and Buysse4 codes) and some apply to all types of

field of corporate govel.nance and audit (recommendations and

companies.

green papers from the European Commission, as well as a series of

While there is no European Corporate Governance Code (yet), a

resolutions of the European Parliament). EU supervisory authorities

European Model Company Act (EMCA) was finalized recently,

are also employing soft law instruments more and more frequently

which claims to have been inspired by the American Model Business

•
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Article 5 Of the Treaty on European Union (`TEU') The 6ubsidiarlty' principle gave more legitimaey to EU interventions concerning public companies than private companies,
because public companies have cross-border activities
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Corporations Law (MBCA). The US has very successfully used

including many public companies (93% of all US initially publicly

model laws, such as the MBCA, as a particular form of soft law.

traded companies and nearly 68% of Fortune 500 companies[°),

Upon adoption by the states, this soft law becomes hard law, but. for

which generate about 25% of the state's general fund through

the states that do not adopt it, maintains its legal nature as soft law.

corporate income taxes and franchise fees.I I These elements dis-

It is the sane with the emblematic Delaware General Corporation

tinguish Delaware from any other US state or EU Member State.

Law (DGCL), which is a form of hard Law in Delaware, but, at the

Other national legislatures lack the ability to follow suit, including

same time, a very persuasive form of soft law everywhere else in the

on the point of being able to implement legislative amendments on

US. Finally, the US also has a corporate govemancc code, repre-

a yearly basis. Soft law can.

sented by the American Law Institute (ALI) Principles of Corporate
Governance (ALI Principles).5

In the EU, corporate governance issues have traditionally been

Moreover, while hard law in principle has a Limited geographical

scope, soft law breaks free from territorial borders and reflects the
globalization of the economy. Finally, while hard law encourages a

regulated at the national level, through corporate governance codes,

formal approach based on textual compliance, soft law favours the

which have a series of unique advantages as compared to any form

appropriation of recommendations by stakeholders and thus con-

of hard law. First, they adapt to the diversity of corporate situations.

stitutes the lever for a real change of practices.

Hard law necessarily subjects situations that may be extremely

The adoption of a European Corporate Governance Code would,

different to the same standard. This `one size fits all' approach has

in my view, promote convergence better than hard law. So far, that

often, and rightly, been criticized. In contrast, soft law allows the

has not been possible. The main reason for this failure lies fi].st and

realities of each company to be taken into account, including based

foremost in the differences between the EU Member States. Other

on the frequently employed `comply or explain' approach: a com-

than divergences on hot topics (for example, gender diversity and
`say on pay'), other obstacles are the existence of a wide variety of

pany that decides to derogate from a rule contained in the code,
which is appl]cable to it, must indicate both the existence of, and the

legal foms of organization of business activities, of board struc-

reasons for, this derogation.6

tures, composition, and practices among EU companies, significant

Soft law also offers a flexibi]ity that hard law does not allow, as it

can be more easily revised to take into account relevant developments. Corporate governance codes are often revised in practice.

differenc,es in investor ownership patterns, engagement practices
among shareholders, and levels of shareholder activity.

Another reason for the failure is the lack of organization of

Moreover, a current trend is the implementation of periodic eva-

employers at the European level, as compared to the national

luation and updating procedures for the corporate governance

level. National employers have been extremely active with respect

codes. In contrast, and as will be discussed in more detail below,

to the development and evolution of national company law,

changes to corporate laws take time and, if political willingness is

particularly in the area of corporate governance. Organizations of

not present, might not even be possible. This is true both at the EU

national employers are very active in proposing and demanding

level and at the national level of the EU Member States.

reforms, and the legislative measures adopted often follow these

Very few legislators are able to mke revisions to their hard
laws at the speed of which revisions to the corporate governance

proposals. In contrast, the organizations that exist at the

European level (Businesseurope, CEEP, UEAPME, European

codes are made.7 One such legislator is Delaware, in the US.

Round Table of Industrialists) find it more difficult to make the

Delaware uses a yearly amendment process of its corporate laws.8

employers' voice heard, because the employers' interests are very

In practice, amendments are ofteri passed unanimously, which

heterogeneous, and not uniforuly affected by the EU

reflects the fact that this particular matter is not subject to partisan

construction.

controversy.9 The rationale for this unusual situation is that, while

These obstacles are not present in a federal country Such as the

Delaware is the Second smallest American state, by population and

US, despite the fact that corporate law is left to the state legislators

surface, it is home to approximately 1.6 million legal entities,

(with the significant exception of federal securities regulation). This

5
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is why the US has a corporate gover,nonce code, represented by the

abandoned their common law doctrine on `corporate opportunity'

ALI Principles.

in order to embrace the test set forth in the ALI Principles. The

ALI is a research organization comprised of prominent judges,

force of this `soft' law instrument is therefore unquestionable. to the

attorneys, and legal scholars whose objective is to clarify and mod-

point that, in 2019, ALI began the process of converting the ALI

ernize US law. ALI has published `Restatements' of basic legal

Principles into a Restatement of Corporate Governance." Although

Subjects, such as Agency, Contracts, Conflict of Laws, Property or

stiu `soft' law, conversion from Principles to a Restatement win

Torts, meant to provide a unifying interpretation of what the law is,

effectively `harden' them, and give them additional persuasive force.

by synthesizing clear legal rules from the larger body of common

In my view, the success of the ALI Principles rests on three

law.`2 Restatements primarily address the courts and are used as

pillars. First, they are limited to corporations, to the exclusion of

authoritative guides for both legal briefs and judicial opinions. All

other business entities. Moreover, in the Sections dealing with the

later developed a series of Principles, addressed primarily to

structure of the corporation, they use varying drafting approaches

administrative agencies and private actors, which focus on best
practices for various public and private institutions, and cover topics

(rules that a well-instructed court would likely embrace, recom-

mendations intended for voluntary adoption, and recommendations

such as Corporate Governance, Transnational Civil Procedure, or

for use as a statutory provision), and distinguish between large

Compliance and Enforcement for Organizations. I 3

publicly held corporations, smaller publicly held corporations, and

The process leading to the adoption of the ALI Principles was

corporations that fit in neither category. Second, the ALI Principles

not easy. It was described as a `oflen bitter fourteen-year battle'[4

are periodically reviewed and updated (three times per year). Third,

from the start of the project in 1978 to the publication in final form

they are accompanied by practically useful commentary directed to

in 1994.[5 While ALI's Restatements had become very influential as

both legislatures and courts.

Further work towards a European Corporate Governance Code

reflections of existing law, the more suggestive nature of the ALI
Principles was initially met with skepticism. Primarily. opponents

should be based on similar premises, and use the EMCA as a

suggested that they reflected corporate interests, rather than state-

starting point. The EMCA was adopted and published in 2017,20 ten

ments of law, while others suggested that they were too intrusive

years after the start of the work, in 2007, on this project.2` It is the

into business practice of corporations.'6

fruit of the efforts of a group of researchers from twenty-two EU

The ALI Principles consist of introductory notes, rules of law in

Member States, and therefore does not have a legislative, European,

black-letter format, corporate practice recommendations, and com-

or national sanction.22 As Such, the drafters were independent from

ments on the following main topics: (i) objective, conduct, and

business organizations, from the governments of the EU Member

structure of the business corporation, (ii) the duty of care and fair

States, and from the European Commission. However, representa-

dealing, (iii) the role of directors and shareholders in transactions in

tives of European Commission were invited to attend drafting

control and tender offers, and (iv) remedies. They explained and

meetings.

The expressly stated objective of the EMCA is the harmonization

restated much of the corporate law as it existed, but also proposed
reforms.17

The ALI Principles illustrate well a reality that has also been

or convergence of European Company Law, with an emphasis on
the need to diversify the mechanism§ used to achieve that purpose.

docunented at the level of EU company law: high quality soft law

The EMCA specifically referenced the inspiration provided by its

often turns into hard law over time. To take just one example, the

American counterpart, the MBCA. A number of unique features

Supreme Courts of at least two US States (Oregon and Maine]8),

characterize the EMCA.
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First, the EMCA was designed as a `free-standing general com-

Committee on Business Corporations of the American Bar

pany statute that can be enacted by Meinber States either substan-

Associat]on (ABA), currently known as the Corporate Laws

tially in its entirety or by the adoption of selected provisions'.23 The

Committee,3° in order to address variations in the law applicable to

intent was not to resolve I)rofound historical divergences between

corporations among US states. Notably, the MBCA only applies to

EU Member States, but rather encourage further harmonization and

corporations and not to any other US business forms. such as LLCs

convergence (as opposed to uniformity) by allowing the EU

and partnerships.

Member States to adopt provisions selectively, based on the unique

needs of the country.
Second, a deliberate decision was made that `|k]ey provisions of

In contrast with corporations, laws governing LLCs vary greatly
from state to state in the US, despite the existence of a Uniform
Limited Liability Company Act, which has not been widely

the EMCA consist of broad standards as opposed to specific rules'.24

adopted.3] With respect to partnerships, the level of harmonization

That was because it was decided that flexibility should prevail so

is somewhere in between corporations and LLCs, with the (Revised)

that specific rules would only apply if imposed by EU directives.

Uniform Partnership Act, followed by most US states,32 and the

Third, the EMCA is a largely enabling statute with relatively few

Revised Uniform Limited Partnership Act. Although some harmo-

mandatory provisions. These features of the EMCA generally par-

nization was achieved through these uniform laws, the additional

allel US corporate law, with its three main components (MBCA,

step of their adoption by the respective US states resulted in less

DGCL and ALI Principles).

uniformity than that existing for corporations.

As of today, the EMCA has not seen widespread adoption across

Similarly, for the MBCA to be legally enforceable, it had to be

EU Member States. That was to be expected because a structural

adopted individually by each state via the releva.nt state legislature.

change of national company laws requires complex choices and

However, the MBCA contains more mandatory provisions than its

processes, and takes time. Another possible reason is the overly-

LLC and partnership counterpart statutes. Although initial adoption

general content of the EMCA. In attem|>ting to create a universal

was slow, the flexible nature of the MBCA, allowing states to modify

model, the EMCA became too diluted to have much practical use to

individual provisions, and its regular revisions, have ultimately

complex legal frameworks that are already in place.25 The scope of

made tbe MBCA attractive to US state legislatures. As of 2021, 32

application of EMCA is `Limited liability companies',26 which

US states, as well as Washington, D.C., have adopted the MBCA,

includes. in US terminology, corporations and LLCs, and, in

either in part or in whole.33

European terminology, a variety of corporate forms at the national

Universal adoption of the MBCA in the US remains doubtful

level. Other deficiencies that can be noted is the lack of a standing

due to Delaware's unique place. Although the DGCL is hard law in

committee that would remain in place to write commentary meant

Delaware, it has become influential as a point of reference for other

to facilitate the adoption of the EMCA and its effective and evolving

states and, as such, represents soft law in other US states, even in

application.27 It was also suggested that the EMCA lacks the backing

those that have based their laws on the MBCA. Delaware court

of a powerful court specialized to hear company law disputes, such

decisions, based on the DGCL, are widely cited and followed even

as the Delaware Chancery Court in the US.28 Despite these short-

when Delaware law is not the applicable law. That is because, in

comings, the EMCA is cited more and more often, especially its

part, the MBCA does not address all matters on which there is

provisions on groups of companies, and suggestions to adopt parts

(abundant) caselaw in Delaware. However, the DGCL and the

of the EMCA by national legislators have started to emerge.29

MBCA often look to each other and `are good partners in a long-

There are major differences between the EMCA and its US

countelpart, the MBCA. The MBCA was drafted in 1950 by the

standing symbiotic relationship'.34 The MBCA may never tie uni-

versally adopted in the US, but its role is, and will continue to be

23

EMCA, at 1.
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28
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influential not only in US corporate law, but, as discussed above,

significantly changed the regulations applicable to public companies

also in EU company law.

in the majority of EU Member States. The most emblematic, and

The European Commission also considered the corporate govemance of private (unlisted) companies in a 2011 Green Paper.35

problematic, are those relating to executive compensation and
transactions with related parties.

I believe that it is not for the EU institutions to develop specific

The use of directives by the EU institutions no longer

rules on corporate governance for unlisted companies. Listed com-

makes it possible to regulate these issues through soft law

panies, with many unlisted subsidiaries, would become significantly

instruments. From this point of view, EU law is hardening,

less competitrve if all the companies in the group were subject to

as is, indirectly but necessarily, national law. I would have

rules in this area, and there is already an unfortunate trend towards

preferred that certain matters that are now covered by the

national legislators applying rules designed for public companies to

Shareholder Engagement Directive (including executive com-

national joint-stock companies, and even limited liability compa-

pensation and transactions with related parties) remained within

nies. Therefore, if the EU institut]ons are to intervene, only the

the bounds of soft law." More generally, I believe that any future

development of general principles and the promotion of the devel-

developments in the field of corporate governance should be the

opment and application of voluntary codes for unlisted companies

result of the interplay between market forces and self-regulation,

would be desirable.

rather than legislative intervention, whether at the EU or at the

Despite the existence of these corporate governance codes and

the many advantages they offer, there have been several EU inter-

national level, given the advantages presented by soft law, discussed above.

ventions in the area of corporate governance in the last 20 years.

The EU institutions are trymg to avoid the trap of the `one size

The first EU interventions were in the form of soft law. The

fits all' approach through the adoption of minimum harmonization

European Commission first adopted two recommendations con-

provisions. However, this type of intervention, which leaves a range

cerning directors of public companies: one in 2004 concerning the

of choices to EU Member States in areas characterized by deep

remuneration of directors,36 and another in 2005 concerning the

divergence, will only deepen those disparities rather than lead to

role of non-executive directors and board committees.37 In 2009,

conyergence. If the EU institutions believe that an accelerated con-

a recommendation was adopted on the issue of remuneration in the

vergence is necessary in this area, a preferable path to legislation

financial services sector.38 The European Commission also pub-

would be to encourage the efforts to adopt a European Corporate

lished two Green Papers: on corporate governance of financial

Governance Code which, as discussed above, have so far been

instifutions (2010)39 and on corporate governance in general

unsuccessful, or to promote the EMCA.

(2o| 1).4° ln 2o|2, the European Commission published its second

European Company Law Action Plan, which also covered corporate
9overnance.4l

Subsequently, the European institutions began to favour inter-

3.

CODES OF CONDUCT FOR pfloFESsloNALS

In addition to corporate governance codes, attempts at self-regula-

ventions through directives, generally of minimal harmonization,

tion can also be seen in a variety of codes of conduct, principles,

but nevertheless with binding effect. The Shareholder Rights

best practices, guidelines or standards. intended for various profes-

Directive was adopted in 200742 and, ten years later, was reinforced

sionals, particularly targeting public companies.

through the Shareholder Engagement Directive of 2ol7.43 The

measures contained in the Shareholder Engagement Directive have

35

Such instruments exist in the banking and insurance sectors

(through a multitude of best practices), with respect to market

European Commission, Greew Paper -77Ic ELr Copomalc Gowma"ce Framework, COM(20ll) 164 final 4-5(5 Apr. 2011), https://Cur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/

HTML/?uri=CELEX:520llDC01648from=EN.
36

37

Recommendation 2004/913/CE of the Commission of 14 Dec. 2004 Fostering an Appropriate Regime for the Remuneration of Directors of Listed Companies.

Recommendation 2005/162/CE of the Cominission of 15 Fab. 2005 on the Role of Non-executive or Supervisory Directors of Listed Companles and on the Committees of the
(Supervisory) Board.

38
39

Recommendation 2009/384/EC of the Commission of 30 Apr. 2009 on Remun€ration Policies in the Financial Services Set.or.
European Commission, Green Pqper -Corpora!c Gal/emance i'" FinaHci'aJ JMs!ilwtl'o#s 4Hd Rcmwwcrali.ok Po/icies, COM(2010) 284 final (2 June 2010), https://Cur-lex.europa.eu/

legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?un=CELEX:52010DC02848rfuom=EN.

40

European Commlssion. Grccn Paper -The ELr Corporate Govem4nce fmmeiiJork, COM(20 I I ) 164 final (5 Apr 2011 ). https.//Cur-len.europa.cu/legal-content/EN/"T/lITML/?
uri=CELEX:520llDC01648rfrom=EN.

41

Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regious, Af/i'on P/aM.

European Company lnw and Corporate Governance - a Modern Legal Framework for More Engaged Shareholders and Sustainable Companies. COM(20\2) 740 final, 12 Dec.
2012,https://Cur-Iex.enropa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:52012DC07408rfrom=FR
42

Directive 2007/36/EC Of the European Parllament and of the Council of 11 July 2007 on the exercise of certain rights of shareholders in listed companies, 2007 0J (L 184) 1724.

43

Direct`ve (EU) 2017/828 Of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 May 2017 amending Directive 2007/36/EC as regards the encouragement of long-term

shareholder engagement.
44

See aJso Klausner, jwj)ra n. 15, at 364.
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infrastructures (fior example, Principle.s i;or f inancial market

(rdting [o chawhg and scrdemenf/,ff whi.ch e`;entually gave may to

infrastructures4S at the international level), proxy voting edvisors,

the EMIR Regulatl.on57 and the DCT Regulatr.on.58

credit rating agencies (for example, the IOSCO Code of conduct
fundamentals for credit rating agencies46), and institutional inves-

Moreover, in the areas covered by these codes of conducts for
professionals, there is also an inflation of soft law that comes from

tors. There are also a variety of instruments that address corporate

EU and national supervisory authorities. Their soft law is not so

social responsibility, targeting particularly large multinational

soft in reality, because these authorities, under the cover of the soft

enterprises, which are often public companies, such as the ISO

law, often assume a law-making role. For this reason, the `soft' law

26000 standard,47 the OECD Guidelines for Multinational

they produce is similar in effect, albeit not in name, to hard law.

Enterprises,48 and the UN Global Compact.49

Some of these instruments of soft law have since tuned into

Soft law instruments emanating from supervisory authorities are

often applied a .comply or explain' or `name and shane' basis

hard law, which is regrettable because the specific benefits of soft

approach, which maltes them a powerful and effective tool of

law are lost (flexibility as opposed to `one size fits all', ease of

exerting pressure on their recipients. There are also many

modification to account for new circumstances or practices, volun-

instances where supervisory authorities have attempted to

tary compliance, etc.).

empower themselves through using soft law instruments.59 One

For example, in a public consultation, ESMA only asked the proxy

voting advisors' industry to develop a code of conduct, having found

technique used by authorities is to use soft law instruments to
interpret hard laws or regulations (often in a `creative' manner)

no evidence of a failure. The industry complied and the largest prox)r

and thereby practically arrive to induce compliance with soft law

voting advisors operating in the EU adopted a code of conduct in

by the recipients. This phenomenon is in a grey zone between the

201450 to which ESMA gave a positive opinion.5` However. the EU

interpretative role that judges normally have, and the normative

institutions intervened in order to e§tablish a `comply or explain' type

role that legislators normally have in civil law countries.

of application of the code of conduct and impose additional transparency obligations on proxy voting advisors, through the Shareholder

As such, the soft law that comes fi.om supervisory authorities

further erases the traditional differences between civil law countries

Engagement Directive. This directive had the sane impact with regard

(most of EU countl.ies) and common law countries (such as the US).

to institutional investors, who had also begun to organize themselves

These supervisory authorities have assumed a quasi-judicial role

through the adoption of codes of conduct, such as those of EFAMA,52

akin to that of common law judges, which raises specific problems

Euromedion53 or |CGN54 or the UK Stewardship Code.55 The sane

of democratic legitimaey. predictability and respect for fundamental

phenomenon existed regarding the code of conduct on trade activities

rights, such as the right to an independent and impartial judge.60
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Committee on Payment and S€ttlement Systems and Techi`ical Committee of the lnterTiational Organlzation of Securiljes Commissions, Pnncip/es /or j#ancj.a/ markc(
in/asl"crwre5 (Apr. 2012), https://www.bis.org/cpmi/publ/d lo I a pdf.

46

IOSCO Technical Committee, Code a/Co"duc! Fundamen!a/s/or Crcdi/ Jtating Agencics (f.rst published in Dec. 2004, as subsequently reVlsed).

47

See https://www.iso.org/standard/42546 html.

48

See http://mneguidelines.oecd org/mneguidelines/.

49

See https://www.unglobalcompact.org/what-is-gc/mission/principles.

SO

Best P[ac+\ces Pmciples Groap, Best Praclice Principles Jot Providers Of Shareholder Voting Research dr Analysis (Mar. 2o\4). https..Ilbpp8ip.\ntoivp-content/uptoedsl2014103l
BPP-ShaTeholdervotmg-Research-2014.pdf. This Instrument was subsequently revised in 2019, 5ee Best Practlccs Pnnci|)leo Group. Bc5t Prac/Jce Pri.Hfij)res /or Provi'ders a/
Sharcho/der Votj#g Rc5carch a. Ana/ysi-s (July 2019), htlps://bppgip Info/wp-content/uploeds/2019/07/2019-Best-Practice-Principles.for-Shareholder-Voting-Research-Analysis

S\

pdfESMA` Final Report Feedback Statement on the Consultation Regarding lhe Role Of the Pray Advisory lrlduslry (19 Pet.. 20\ 3), https:ll`ow'w.es:ir\a.ouropa.ou/siteslde[ond`ltiilesl

library/2015/ I I/2013-84.pdf. Scc aha ESMA Press Release, ESMA PubJi'5kes Report on Pray Advl'sorj. ,Best Pract!ce P"cipJc§ ( 18 Dec. 2015), https://www.esma.europa.eu/esma`
publishes.report-proxy-advisors%E2%80%99-best-practice-principles.
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EF^MA, Code f or Exlemal Governance. Prtnc.pies f or the Exerc.se Of ormership RIghts in lnvestee C:ompantes (201 \ ), httpe=//www demo.onglsi`esldedaul`l£\eslprb\\ca`\onsl \ \ 4o35%20EFAMA%20ECG_final_6%20April962020119620v2.i>df.

53

EuroiTiedion Corporate Governance Forum, Besl Practices /or Engaged Share-Owncrship /"lcndcd /or furomcdi.o" Pariicl'pan/s (2011 ), https //www.eumedion.nl/en/public/
knowledgenctwork/best-practicesn)esLpractices-engaged-share-ownership.pdf
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lcGN, Sralcmcnl a/ Pr!ucip/a /or Jus/i'/ullo"al /#vcslor J{esponsibi/jll'es (2013), https://www.icgn.org/sites/defaulufiles/ICGN%20lnstitulional9620Investor%20R€sponsibilities_0.

55

I,df.
Financial Reporting Council, The uK Slcwardshi'p Code (2020), https://w``w.frc.ong.uk/getattachment/5aae59 I d-d9d3.4cf4-814a-d l4e I 56al d87/Stewardship-Code_Dee-19-

Final-Corrected pdf.
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FESE, EACH, ECSDA, Code a/ Conduc/ /or CJ€arjng and Seff/e"cw/ (7 Nov. 2006). https://www.six-group.com/swiss-sptc/dam/downloads/swiss.sptc/documents/sptc-dokucode-of-conduct-en.pdf.

57

Regulation (EU) No 648/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 |uly 2012 on OTC derivatives, central counterpartles and trade repositories.

58

RegulatioT` (EU) No 909/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 July 2014 on improving securities settlement ln the European Union and on central

sccurit-es depositones and amending Directives 98/26/EC and 2014/65/EU and Regulation (EU) No 236/2012.

59

Case T-496l\\, United Kingdom Of Great Bntoin and Nortliern Ireland v. Euroiican Central Bank` |udgri:lent Of the General Co\in (Fourth Chambe[)` 4 Mar. 20\5: F"ppo
^nnur\zi\ata, Interpreter ou 'tegif erer? Un nouvel eryeu iiour les aulorit6s de contr6le des nrarch6s f ina"ers, Rev. Des Socie`es 615 (\995).
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Consequently, judicial review of soft law emanating from super-

drafters used the work product of other countries as their

vlsory authorities is increasing.6'

starting point. The French, British and Swedish corporate governance code have been very influential, in the absence of a

European Code of Colporate Governance, having served as the
4.

TRENDS

starting point for the elaboration of national codes in other

When considered collectively, a number of tendencies may be observed

countries or having been voluntarily adopted by foreign com-

regarding the instruments of soft law. In a nutshell, soft law is a very

panies. The adoption of the EMCA might, in time. contribute
popular girl nowadays, but not everybody loves popular girts, and they

to further convergence as did the MBCA in the US. The role of

do tend to create drama and sometimes colour outside the lines:

soft law as a driver of convergence is particularly visible for

I. One tendency is that soft law instruments multiply and diver-

typically voluntary as to their adoption by public companies,

law based on traditional legal instruments (EU directives, EU

once adopted, they apply on a `comply or explain' basis, which

regulations, national laws, national regulations). The nomen-

leads to convergence by encouraging voluntary compliance.

clature of these instruments does not cease to evolve either:

Moreover, public authorities have started making reference, in

orientations,

their own instruments, to these corporate governance codes

recommendations,

green papers,

instructions,

positions, guidelines, practical guides, questions/answers, state-

(which have a private source), to demand their respect and/or

ments of good practices, codes of conduct, stewardship codes,

to interpret them in a certain manner.63

policies, frameworks, etc. Given this abundance of new legal

I.astly, many instances of transformation of soft law into hard law

instruments, some national authorities undertook the task of

exist, accompanied by a general phenomenon of hardening of com-

trying to classify them in order to better reflect their place

pany Law, including because instniments Sometimes labelled `soft law'

within the hierarchy of sources of law.62

are in reality closer in effect to hard law. This tendency exists both at

2. Another tendeney is the convergence of soft law, which, in

61

62

pubhic companies. Although corporate governance codes are

sify, thereby upsetting the traditional hierarchy of sources of

the EU level and in EU Member States and can be observed parti-

turn, provokes further convergence of the binding legal frame-

cularly in the areas of colporate governance and regulation of market

wol.k. The adoption of a particular instrument of soft law by

infrastructures. I discussed how the Shareholder Engagement

one country, or one sector has led to the adoption of similar

Directive replaced the soft law contained in several recommendations

instruments by other countries or by other sectors. As an

of the European Commission, in national corporate governance

example, the corporate governance codes for public companies

codes, and in codes of conduct. I also discussed certain self-regulating

(adopted by various national entities) have reached a sponta-

codes of conduct gave way to EU bindmg instruments (directives or

neous level of convergence simply because certain national

regulations). The examples could go on.

See a.g., Conseil d'£tat (France). 21 Mar. 2016 (F4irvesla decision no. 368084).

For example. the French supcrvlsory authonty for financial markets, the Authorit6 des March6§ Financiers (AMF), publ]shed Pn%cipc5 d'orga"i.sfllloH cJ de pwbJjca!I-o" de la

docrririe de /'AMF (25 0ct. 2020), https://www.amf-france.org/fr/reglementation/doctnne/principes-de-doctrine.
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Herv€ Syn`'et, Lc droitfHancicr: w" droi! dos/orls, 3 Bulletin Joly Bours€ (Mar. 2014).
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